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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb . . . ." Elegant and succinct in its constitutional codification, the real
world application of double jeopardy law has often been confused and tedious;
it has become "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the
most intrepid judicial navigator."2 A great deal of the confusion involves the
phrase "same offense." Clarity remains elusive in part because courts and
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
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commentators have adopted multiple, inconsistent analyses of offenses.3 Some
approaches seem initially plausible but fail to address conceptual difficulties, 4
while others are conceptually rich but involve complexities that are foreign to
the judiciary. 5
This Note proposes that previous approaches share a fundamental flaw.
To evaluate the flaw, it is critical to understand the entire, distinct structure of
the judiciary. The judiciary's distinctness is familiar through the principle of the
separation of powers - a separation that will be shown to be much more pro-
found and consequential than is usually supposed. The thesis of this Note is that
the separation of powers - the specific legal processes and institutions that sepa-
rate the judiciary from other legally relevant fora - frustrates traditional analyses
of offense identity. The traditional analyses fail because they assume that the
actors within the judiciary can and should step outside of the judiciary to deter-
mine offense identity, and, ultimately, criminal liability. The independence of
the judiciary, as demonstrated by its rules, forms and objects, makes any attempt
at crossing the separation between powers problematic. It is within the judicial
proceeding that the fundamental institutions of judicial powers interact with the
other branches of government to create the only meaningful context in which
criminal offenses can be represented and in which criminal liability can be de-
termined.
After a brief introduction, Part H of this Note will examine the existing
double jeopardy precedential landscape. In Part III, the discussion will try to
give order to the jurisprudence and logic that lies behind the case law by turning
to the double jeopardy analyses developed by leading commentators. Part IV
will consider the separation of powers in depth, building a case for a new under-
standing of how separate the judiciary really is. That new understanding will be
applied to the existing law and the various scholarly approaches in Part V. Re-
jecting the existing approaches, the discussion will uncover the more serious
fault in double jeopardy jurisprudence. The fault is a failure to appreciate the
full scope of the judiciary's separation from other branches of government and
from other legally relevant parts of the world. This thesis is somewhat unortho-
dox, thus, arguments for and against it will be explored at length - but the effort
is necessary to come to an understanding of a confused and inherently difficult
area of law. In Part VI, the discussion will turn to possible remedies, noting the
extent to which courts have adopted the suggested approach. The Note will
conclude with the modest hope of having persuaded the reader that the sug-
gested approach - recognizing the true independence of the judiciary and the
3 See Jacqueline E. Ross, Damned Under Many Headings: The Problem of Multiple Punish-
ment, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245, 257 (2002).
4 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Anar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807
(1997), discussed infra Part IL A.
5 See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, ACT AND CRIME (Clarendon Press 1993); GEORGE C. THOMAS,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY, THE HISTORY, THE LAW (New York University Press 1998), both discussed
infra Part IH.B-C.
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role of that independence in determining criminal offenses and liability - is nec-
essary to explain the causes of some of the difficulties in double jeopardy analy-
Sis.
6
H. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background: Double Jeopardy History and Case Law
Laws against placing someone twice in jeopardy are ancient.7 In more
modern times, Blackstone wrote of the "universal maxim of the common law of
England, that no man is to be brought into ieopardy of his life, more than once,
for the same offence." 8  In American law, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
United States Constitution "protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal[,] ... against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction[,]... [a]nd it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense."' 0 In addition to the federal double jeopardy protection, made applica-
ble to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,' 1 all fifty states have either con-
stitutional, statutory, or common law12 double jeopardy prohibitions.
The effectiveness of double jeopardy protections, however, often de-
pends on how courts interpret "same offense."' 3 The law that currently governs
the analysis of whether one offense is the same as another for double jeopardy
purposes comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Blockburger v. United
States.'4 In Blockburger, the defendant was charged and convicted of both sell-
ing medical drugs that were not in their original, stamped packages and also
6 Some other aspects of double jeopardy jurisprudence will go largely unaddressed. See Crist
v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (when jeopardy attaches); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (the
prosecution by different sovereigns of the same offense).
7 "The laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same issue . 1. " I Demosthenes 589
(J Vince trans., 4th ed. 1970) (cited in Whalen v. U.S. 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980)) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
8 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 329 (1809). For a more thorough history, see
THOMAS, supra note 5, at 46.
9 For an excellent historical analysis of the double jeopardy clause in American law, see
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-42 (1975).
10 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (overruled on other grounds).
I' Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
12 See Appendix A.
13 While some state courts define "same offense" differently in the successive and multiple
prosecution contexts see infra notes 29-31, the Court in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704
(1993), made the federal interpretation the same in every context. The distinction is largely ir-
relevant to this Note's approach. However, for a discussion of the difference between contexts
see Ann Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A Proposed
Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183 (2004).
14 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
2007]
3
Tsiatsos: Double Jeopardy Law and the Separation of Powers
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
selling those drugs without a written order.1 5 The defendant challenged the
convictions on the grounds that the two offenses were the same., 6 The Court
held that "the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or
only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not." 17 Since each offense required proof of different facts, the de-
fendant could properly be convicted for both. 18 By itself, the Blockburger test is
seemingly straightforward. Though the test it announces has a lengthy pedi-
gree,19 Blockburger stands together with subtle and not so subtle historical coun-
tertrends that make its application less clear. The Court has at times gone be-
yond Blockburger, and, as will be shown, has resolved double jeopardy cases in
ways that suggest an alternate approach.2°
The most prominent example of the Court's addition to Blockburger
came in 1990, in the case of Grady v. Corbin.21 In Grady, the defendant, Cor-
bin, driving while intoxicated, struck an oncoming car and killed its driver.22
Later that evening, Corbin was given two tickets relating to the traffic viola-
tion.23 While the prosecution was preparing its homicide case against him, Cor-
bin went to traffic court and pled guilty on the traffic violations.2 4 When the
district attorney was ready to prosecute, Corbin argued that his previous guilty
plea to the traffic charges barred the subsequent homicide prosecution.2 5 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that while the analysis must begin with the
Blockburger test, another step is necessary. 26 The additional step for the Grady
Court was to determine if the subsequent prosecution "will prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.,
27
15 Id. at 300-01.
16 Id. at 301.
17 Id. at 304. How exactly Blockburger deals with the issue of lesser included offenses is not
clear. Blockburger's element test would seemingly prohibit prosecution on a lesser offense (e.g.
robbery) that is included in a greater offense (e.g. armed robbery) that is also charged since the
statutory elements of the robbery offense will not require any additional proof than that needed for
the armed robbery offense. However, the Court in Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 786
(1985) held that lesser included offenses were in fact distinct from the greater offense and could
be charged and that convictions could be had on both.
18 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
19 One of the earliest antecedents for Blockburger style counting is King v. Vandercomb, 2
Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 460 (1796) (cited in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688,
710 (1993)).
20 See infra Part VI.
21 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
22 Id. at 511.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 512.
25 Id. at 514.
26 Id. at 516.
27 Id. at 521.
[Vol. 109
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Because the homicide prosecution would make use of the conduct to which
Corbin pled guilty at traffic court, the Court barred it.
28
The test for offense identity was expanded from Blockburger's "proof
of additional facts," to include the larger context of the defendant's conduct.
Justice Scalia, in a vigorous dissent, complained that this addition to Block-
burger was unprecedented and predicted its timely demise.29
Indeed, three years later in United States v. Dixon,30 a majority of the
court rejected Grady and reaffirmed Blockburger's status as the sole test for
determining if offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes. 3' Justice
Scalia wrote:
We have concluded ... that Grady must be overruled. Unlike
Blockburger analysis, [which] has deep historical roots and has
been accepted in numerous precedents of this Court, Grady
lacks constitutional roots. The "same-conduct" rule it an-
nounced is wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court
precedent and with the clear common-law understanding of
double jeopardy.32
Since Dixon's reaffirmation of Blockburger, the Dixon-Blockburger test
comprises the Court's controlling double jeopardy jurisprudence concerning the
sameness of offenses.33 Additionally, most states follow Blockburger analysis
for their own double jeopardy provisions. 34 A few states go beyond Block-
burger and approach a Grady style test. 35 At least two states use double jeop-
ardy offense identity tests that differ from both Blockburger and Grady.36
I. ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO OFFENSE IDENTITY IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY
LAW
Despite Blockburger's persistence as valid precedent, commentators
have not spared its "same elements" test from critical analysis.37 In trying to
28 In this instance it was certain that the homicide prosecution would make use of the same
conduct since the prosecutor submitted a bill of particulars that explicitly contained the same
conduct. Id. at 513-14.
29 Id. at 543.
30 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
31 See infra Part V.B.
32 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704.
33 United States v. Sessa, 125 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1997).
34 See Appendix B.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Critique of double jeopardy jurisprudence has taken many different forms. For an outline of
the different approaches, see Ross, supra note 3, at 257-65. This Note focuses on the most plausi-
2007]
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improve on Blockburger, however, most commentators have missed the most
serious difficulty. The approaches presented in this section highlight two differ-
ent aspects of the same problem: a failure to appreciate the limitations of the
judiciary.
A. The "Same Means Same" Approach
One straightforward approach to remedying confusion about what
counts as the same offense is to demand a literal identity between statutory ele-
ments.38 This "same means same" approach is laudable for its simplicity. Un-
der this approach, there is no question of differentiating lesser included offenses,
for example, the robbery element of an armed robbery. The lesser included rob-
bery is simply a different offense and the state can prosecute both.39
This approach raises significant questions. Hypothetically, the "same
means same" approach would allow the legislature to write several statutes,
each with subtly differing elements that serve to increase a defendant's punish-
ment. For example, the legislature, in addition to outlawing vehicular homicide,
could write a law prohibiting vehicular homicide while driving over the speed
limit, or, vehicular homicide between the hours of 2:00 am and 6:00 am.40 Ob-
viously, each statute would have a different element and so a defendant could be
punished for violating each statute. Technically, neither the "same means same"
approach nor Blockburger would prohibit the second prosecution. Such results
are not surprising since courts defer to legislative intent in this context. In fact,
the Blockburger test has often been seen primarily as a rule for discerning legis-
lative intent, yielding to a contrary legislative will when clearly announced. 41
ble approaches formulated post Blockburger. While other proposed approaches are often concep-
tually problematic, the approaches discussed herein are conceptually sound and well argued by
their respective proponents. Finally, the approaches chosen serve to highlight better than others
the central problem as developed infra Parts I-I.
38 This is the approach of Akhil Reed Amar. See supra note 4. Professor Amar would prevent
some of the more blatant possible prosecutorial abuses by invoking due process principles. Amar,
supra note 4, at 1812.
39 Amar, supra note 4, at 1814-15.
40 This is a problem that other commentators have also noticed, even if not ascribing to it the
same importance as does this Note. See Poulin, supra note 13, at 1189; Claire Finkelstein, Posi-
tivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REv. 335, 352 (2000); Charles William Hendricks,
100 Years of Double Jeopardy Erosion: Criminal Collateral Estoppel Made Extinct, 48 DRAKE L.
REv. 379, 402 (2000). For why this problem should be taken more seriously see infra notes 140-
44 and accompanying text.
41 See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 360 (1983) ("[W]here, as here, a legislature specifically
authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes
proscribe the 'same' conduct under Blockburger, a court's task of statutory construction is at an
end and the prosecution may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment
under such statutes in a single trial."); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) ('The
Blockburger test is a 'rule of statutory construction,' and because it serves as a means of discern-
ing congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear
indication of contrary legislative intent."). Yet this is another issue that the Dixon court failed to
[Vol. 109
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Perhaps it is right to so defer; it is not the judiciary's job - we prefer our elected
legislature to codify our beliefs about what is worthy of punishment.42 Perhaps
the legislature in the above hypotheticals found that vehicular homicide while
driving over the speed limit was a sign of road rage that was on the increase in
that jurisdiction, or that traffic fatalities related to drowsiness were most com-
mon between 2:00 am and 6:00 am. However, it is also possible there were no
such findings. 43 Perhaps the legislature in the above hypotheticals found that
vehicular homicide while driving over the speed limit was a sign of road rage
that was on the increase in that jurisdiction, or that traffic fatalities related to
drowsiness were most common between 2:00 am and 6:00 am. However, it is
also possible there were no such findings. The legislature may have acted irra-
tionally or wrongfully by multiplying offenses. While one hesitates to encour-
age judges to adopt the legislator's task of declaring what is worthy of punish-
ment, an analysis of offense identity that would focus only on the literal identity
of the statutory language would deprive the court of its ability to rationally test
legislation."
B. The "Event Blameworthiness" Approach
The second type of scholarly approach would involve courts and law
makers in a detailed analysis of offenses and events. This approach is consid-
erably more complex, and by virtue of its complexity it asks the courts to do too
much.
Professor Michael Moore's book, Act and Crime,45 effectively demon-
strates when offenses are the same and how statutes describe and punish of-
fenses. In order to understand when offenses are the same, one must understand
exactly what an offense is.46 For double jeopardy offense identity purposes,
explicitly address. Is Blockburger merely a tool for discerning legislative intent or does it define
offense identity? In many cases the point will be moot since most states have adopted Block-
burger type definitions for their interpretation of "same offense." See Appendix B. Justice
Scalia's language in Dixon suggests that the Court indeed defined offense identity. See infra Part
V.B. Additionally, in Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 173 (2001) (citing Blockburger), the court
wrote: "[w]e see no constitutional difference between the meaning of the term 'offense' in the
contexts of double jeopardy and of the right to counsel." Though proceeding on the assumption
that Blockburger via Dixon is more than a mere indicator of legislative intent, this Note will not be
affected by the opposite assumption since on either assumption the more serious fault remains the
same. See infra Part V.C.2.
42 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) ("It is the legislature, not
the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.").
43 But see FCC v. Beach Comnc'ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) ("[A] legislative choice is not
subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evi-
dence or empirical data.").
44 For a discussion of the judiciary's ability to rationally test legislation, see infra Part V.C. 1.
45 See MooRE, supra note 5.
46 Id.at 60.
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Moore subjects the acts and events that underlie criminal offenses to a philoso-
pher's discussion of properties and universals.47 Difficulties involved in sin-
gling out, or individuating, events give rise to the concern that only identically
worded statutes can single out the same offenses.48
The concern involves arbitrariness. Where does one draw the line in
singling out an event from the larger context? For example, how distinct is the
event that constitutes criminally reckless driving? One may consider it an event
in and of itself, but its composition is unclear and its boundaries are made im-
precise by the fact that it is an artifact of human behavior and not a "natural
kind," - that is, a distinct property of the world that does not depend on human
conventions. 49 An analysis of reckless driving involves essentially arbitrary
conventions concerning speed limits, road conditions, car movements, as well as
a piecemeal analysis of the smaller events that make up driving (pressing the
accelerator, turning the wheel, checking the mirrors, etc.) and various other ele-
ments, none of which are found in the natural world independent of human con-
vention.
In the double jeopardy context, problems arise when one considers ex-
actly how to analyze the events constituting the offense. Where does the of-
fense begin and end? Of how many smaller offenses was the larger offense
composed? Is each composite action, for example, pulling a trigger five times
during a shooting, a separate offense? Moore eventually answers the problems
by showing that moral salience, the blameworthiness of a defendant's acts, can
properly define and individuate offense events for double jeopardy purposes.5 °
Blameworthiness is a real property that can be used to non-arbitrarily delineate
event boundaries.51 Consider the prosecution of a defendant who crashed her
car into another vehicle, killing its occupant. The prosecutor may charge the
defendant with both vehicular manslaughter and negligent homicide. Under
Blockburger, since each charge requires proof of something the other does not
(the use of a vehicle in one, negligence in the other), both charges would be
allowed.52 Not so under Moore's analysis. For Moore, in order to determine
how many offenses are present for double jeopardy purposes, the question to ask
is how many homicidal or manslaughtering acts were present in the event. The
47 Id. at 328. Professor Moore performs a careful analysis of different theories of event indi-
viduation. See id. at 305-90.
48 Id. at 335. In this regard, Moore's hypothetical skeptic who worries if events can ever be
properly individuated by a given label very nearly approaches the "same means same" approach
discussed supra in notes 38-44. See also infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
49 MOORE, supra note 5, at 184-88. Moore's examples of natural kinds are things like gold,
water, whales, etc. Id. at 184.
50 Id. at 337-90.
51 See id. at 343 for Moore's answer to those who are skeptical about moral properties.
52 Of course if the vehicular manslaughter charge requires the prosecution to prove negligence
as an element of the offense, then, absent any other distinguishing elements, the charges would not
be separate under Blockbuger and one would bar the other.
[Vol. 109
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answer is only one. The other aspects of the event as charged under the respec-
tive statutes (the use of the vehicle or the negligent behavior) are not as morally
relevant and do not contribute to the blameworthiness analysis.
Asking courts to make decisions about the particulars of event identity
53
or to determine units of moral blameworthiness is perhaps to ask too much.
Both the "same means same" approach and the event-blameworthiness approach
concern the interaction between the different actors involved in the legal proc-
ess. What should be the respective roles of the legislature and the judiciary?
The conceptual difficulties involved in double jeopardy analysis prohibit easy
reliance on the roles of law maker versus law interpreter. Before we can allo-
cate such responsibility, we must reach conceptual clarity regarding those roles.
Addressing this issue, Professor George C. Thomas expands on the
moral blameworthiness approach to offense identity by making clear exactly
whose job it is to individuate events according to blameworthiness. 54 Thomas
places responsibility for determinations of blameworthiness squarely on the
legislature,55 stating that deference to the legislature is "what is historically true
and institutionally required about double jeopardy. 56
In allocating responsibility for determinations of blameworthiness,
commentators such as Thomas make certain assumptions about the nature of the
judiciary and its role with respect to the other branches. These assumptions are
widely held but ultimately problematic. The remainder of this Note will exam-
ine those assumptions and offer a different perspective on the judiciary and its
institutional interactions.
IV. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
As the discussion progresses, the structural faults relied upon by other
approaches will become clear. Yet in order to elucidate those faults, this Note
must raise a new and perhaps unfamiliar conceptual framework. This frame-
work encompasses, but in many important respects extends beyond, the tradi-
tional notion of the judiciary as a separate branch of government. Accordingly,
a thorough explanation of the proper framework for understanding the judicial
world is vital. The goal is to see the judiciary in all its factual and institutional
being. This world of the judiciary is created by grand legal concepts and also by
the smaller, everyday workings of legal professionals. In sum, these factors
53 "Event identity" and "offense identity" are used interchangeably in the subsequent discus-
sion because, in the double jeopardy context, the relevant event is a criminal offense. In some
instances it will prove useful to refer to the spatiotemporal event as opposed to the criminal of-
fense. It will also prove useful, in other instances, to combine the two aspects under the term
"offense event."
54 THOMAS, supra note 5.
55 See id. at 272-275 for a helpful summary.
56 Id. at 275.
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create a world the independence of which is noted in theory but seldom appreci-
ated in fact.
A. Traditional Separation of Powers Analysis
The separation of powers is a familiar concept. The idea is present in
the structure of the Constitution57 and explicitly referenced by writers who con-
tributed to the creation of the Republic.58 From an early age, students learn
about the careful checks and balances introduced by the framers to prevent tyr-
anny. 59 Each branch plays a distinct role and each role is reserved for that
branch. 6° The Supreme Court noted that:
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the
three general departments of government entirely free from the
control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the
others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious
question. So much is implied in the very fact of the separation
of the powers of these departments by the Constitution; and in
the rule which recognizes their essential coequality.
61
For example, it is the role of the judiciary to say what the law is. 62 De-
termination of jurisdiction is ultimately a job for the courts.63 Judicial decisions
cannot be overturned by another branch of government.64 If the judiciary were
not truly independent, it would cease being a judiciary under the meaning of the
Constitution. 65 There is a design to this separation. The goal "is basic and vital
. .. namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of
government in the same hands." 66
Yet, the Supreme Court, while often referring to the separation of pow-
ers doctrine, has never articulated a coherent, substantive jurisprudence on the
57 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (per curiam) ("the Constitution was
nonetheless true to Montesquieu's well-known maxim that the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments ought to be separate and distinct").
58 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48 (James Madison).
59 "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
60 Id.; See also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48 (James Madison).
61 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
62 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
63 Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069 (2001).
64 Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).
65 District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1901).
66 O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 109
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol109/iss2/11
DOUBLE JEOPARDY LAW
subject.67 Separation of powers decisions rest on a superficial level of analy-
sis. 68 The Court mentions branch roles and takes for granted their legal ef-
fects. 69 The lack of analytic depth in separation of powers case law is striking.7 °
Two-hundred years of separation of powers decisions have provided only a few
analytical nuances. 71 Perhaps the most prominent development in separation of
powers jurisprudence has been rise of the contrasting analytical approaches:
formalism and functionalism.
72
The formalist approach to the separation of powers involves inquiring
into the formal characteristics of each branch of government. 73 The judiciary's
form, for example, is given in Article III and questions of judicial power are,
under the formalist approach, determined by reference to the constitutional as-
signments of power.
7
The functionalist approach stresses overlapping of branch roles, es-
chewing strict reliance on the textual forms in favor of the flexibility necessary
to the operation of such a large and diverse government.75 For example, it is
67 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) ("That this system of division and
separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent .... ");
see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513,
1517 (1991) ("[T]he Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional separation of powers is an
incoherent muddle.").
68 See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 513 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (calling the majority's separation of powers analysis "superficial in the extreme").
69 Brown, supra note 67 at 1518 ("In the field of separated powers the Court has not really
"gotten it" at all. It has adopted no theory, embraced no doctrine, endorsed no philosophy, that
would provide even a starting-point for debate.").
70 M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U.
PA. L. REv. 603, 612 (2001) ("given that the doctrine and many theoretical approaches profess
commitment to the separation of the three functions, the remarkable fact about the doctrine and
literature is that very little of it is devoted to identifying their contours").
71 See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cisar & Martin H. Redish, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 450 (1991) ("The
Court has gone from one extreme to the other, with the assertion of what are at best tenuous dis-
tinctions."). For a thorough demonstration of the historical analytical weakness of the separation
of powers doctrine, see William B. Gwyn, The American Constitutional Tradition of Shared and
Separated Powers: The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers, 30
WM. & MARY L. REv. 263, 264 (1989) ("Most late eighteenth-century American accounts of the
separation of powers doctrine were very superficial. Rarely does one find an explanation for why
such a separation is desirable beyond vague references to its necessity in achieving 'liberty' and
avoiding 'tyranny."').
72 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REv. 989, 997
(2006).
73 Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2003).
74 U.S. CONST. art. IL
75 Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a
Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 705 (2006).
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convenient and constitutionally permissible for non-Article III bodies to exer-
cise traditionally judicial powers in some instances.76
Yet, this most important distinction in separation of powers analysis
amounts to little. Important separation of powers cases often seem to support
both approaches. 77 The Court, by not explaining which if any approach it fa-
vors,78 has left the state of the law unclear.79
The apparent superficiality of the separation of power analysis may not
be problematic, however, if not much can be said.80 If all one can do is to point
to the respective branches of government and their roles and say that, in a par-
ticular instance, one branch acted impermissibly outside its bounds, the analysis
need go no further. 81 The familiarity of these bedrock civics principles may
make deeper analysis unnecessary 82 - the analysis is simple because everyone
takes it for granted once the particular separation of powers violation is pointed
out by the Court.83
76 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1986) ("the
constitutionality of a given congressional delegation of adjudicative functions to a non-Article II
body must be assessed by reference to the purposes underlying the requirements of Article m.
This inquiry, in turn, is guided by the principle that practical attention to substance rather than
doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article 1M.") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
7n William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separa-
tion of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 22 (1998).
78 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Power
Questions - A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 489 (1987) ("The Supreme Court
has vacillated over the years between using a formalistic approach to separation-of-powers issues
grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of government (and
consequently appearing to draw rather sharp boundaries), and a functional approach that stresses
core function and relationship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not
threatened.").
79 Schor, 478 U.S. at 847 ("our precedents in this area do not admit of easy synthesis").
80 No less an authority than James Madison despaired of finding clarity in this field. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison) ("the science of government has [not] been able to
discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces - the legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary"). See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("the Court focuses on 'the idea of separation of powers,' as if the mere incantation of that phrase
provides an obvious solution to the difficult questions presented") (citations and internal punctua-
tion omitted).
81 Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH.
L. REv. 592, 593 (1986) ("problems of separation of powers have more often been sought to be
resolved by invoking one or the other of the classifications as a shibboleth").
82 In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime etc., 783 F.2d 370, 375 (3d Cir. 1986)
("Separation of powers questions are relatively uncomplicated when they involve institutions
within the three branches of government").
83 However, the lack of analytical depth in separation of powers cases should in no way sug-
gest that the doctrine of separation of powers is any less important than commonly assumed. See,
e.g., Cisar & Redish, supra note 71, at 472 ("if we have begun to take the value of separation of
powers for granted, we need only look to modern American history to remind ourselves about
[Vol. 109
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Apart from the most basic analysis, what does it mean for one govern-
mental power to be separated from another? While traditional separation of
powers discussions have not proven very substantive, "[tihe power inherent in a
court by virtue of its sheer existence is broader and more fundamental than the
inherent power conferred by separation of powers."'84 On either the formalist or
functionalist approach, something more is taken for granted: a power is some-
thing that has a form or something that exercises a function. But if power is not
merely an abstraction, then something more concrete must be presupposed.85
B. The Separation of Powers Reconsidered: Institutions and Presupposi-
tions
While it is uncontroversial to speak of the institutions embodying the
respective powers of government, 86 the notion of an institution is somewhat
abstract.87 The actual functioning of judicial institutions, however, may demon-
strate how exactly they give substance to the power that they embody.88
Law exists in a world of facts and objects. Legal processes are shaped
by clerks and court officials, documents, the specifics of pleadings, memos and
copies, preliminary rulings and countless similar elements. These diverse proc-
esses and details are the factual elements of the legal environment - they com-
bine with the abstractions of legal theory to constitute the judicial world.
In a double jeopardy case, the question of offense identity is similarly
represented by various elements in the judicial world. The prosecution, in its
both the general vulnerability of representative government, and the direct correlation between the
concentration of political power and the threat to individual liberty").
8 Blackjack Bonding v. City of Las Vegas Mun. Court, 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (Nev. 2000) (em-
phasis added).
85 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) ("The principle of separation of powers was not
simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers .... ); Gen. Assembly of N.J. v.
Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 443 (N.J. 1982) ("we cannot decide what constitutes excessive legislative
power merely by intoning the abstract principles of separation of powers").
86 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art IM, § I "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."); Bates v. State, 197 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Ark. 1946) ("Courts are institutions wherein the
State's judicial powers repose.").
87 See Konikov v. Orange County, 410 F.3d 1317, 1325 (1lth Cir. 2005) ("More formal is the
definition of 'institution,' which is 'an established society or corporation: an establishment or
foundation [especially] of a public character .... ') (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (8th
ed. 2004)) (internal quotation marks altered).
88 See Judicial Attys. Ass'n v. State, 586 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Mich. 1998) ("The power of each
branch of government within its separate sphere necessarily includes managerial administrative
authority to carry out its operations"); and Honorable Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the
Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1543, 1560 (1997)
(noting the impact of separation of powers principles on the day to day operations of state courts).
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charging document, will offer an account of the offense allegedly committed.89
For double jeopardy purposes and pursuant to Blockburger, the offense as pre-
sented will be compared to the relevant statute.9° Though none of the legal ac-
tors, save the defendant,91 has any contact with the offense as it actually hap-
pened, the prosecutor reconstructs the offense from the perspective of witness,
the police reports and other relevant information. The offense so reconstructed
is the offense within the judicial proceedings.
The reconstructed offense event becomes part of a world that is com-
plete in and of itself. Speaking perhaps allegorically, the Supreme Court has
spoken of "the four comers of the federal judicial process .... In a more
practical sense, the judicial world is self-contained. The principles and struc-
tures governing the events of the judicial world are internal to it.93 This self-
sufficiency is an important characteristic because it is a logical prerequisite for
independence. 94 The judiciary's independence would be compromised if it had
to rely on external sources for the completion of its essential tasks.9' The judi-
cial power would not be separate if Congress could control its essential and in-
herent functions. 96
The judiciary coheres, it is made consistent, by virtue of the familiar
processes and institutions that operate within it. Stare decisis is one powerful
89 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("the decision whether or not to prose-
cute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the prosecu-
tor's] discretion").
90 See, e.g., United States v. Bolen, 136 Fed. Appx. 325, 329 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("Comparing the
indictment to the charged statute of violation, it is clear that the indictment sufficiently alleged
each element of the offense ....").
91 The defendant will have contact with the extra-judicial world offense event only if he or she
actually committed the crime or was otherwise present, of course.
92 Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 362 (1984).
93 This Note will examine how evidence, principles of law, legislative intent and other impor-
tant and familiar elements are imported into the judicial world. See infra Part V.C.
94 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IMI § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Ser-
vices, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
95 In re Furnishings and Equipment for Judge, Courtroom and Personnel for Courtroom Two,
423 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ohio 1981) ("Courts possess all powers necessary to secure and safeguard the
free and untrammeled exercise of their judicial functions.").
96 See People v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 893 (111. 1988) ("it is not within the legislature's
power to enact statutes solely concerning court administration or the day-to-day business of the
courts"). Though, the branches of government are not "hermetically sealed." Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). This Note does not suggest that other branches cannot exercise some of
the functions of the judicial world. That sort of cross-world identity of functions satisfies the
various decisions holding that the separation is not total. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 217
(2005). The overlapping powers contemplated by some courts are essentially overlapping func-
tions. See Fla. Motor Lines v. R.RI Comm'rs, 129 So. 876, 881 (Fla. 1930) (equating separated
powers with functions). That functional separation differs from the factual and substantive sepa-
ration argued for in this Note.
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example, making the law predictable and the judgments reliable. 97 Attorneys
and other legal actors have established ways of practice that depend on orderly
and well-defined procedures. 98 When a client brings his case to an attorney, a
new set of rules and a new type of life, at least for the duration of her case, await
her. Judicial procedures sometimes depend on the interpretation of substantive
law, but they are generally local processes and events. A story told to an attor-
ney, the filing of a complaint or the execution of a writ - these are the events on
which people within the system depend. They serve as benchmarks, as bounda-
ries, sometimes delineating the bounds of coercive power, sometimes serving as
points of entry into the judicial world with attendant hopes of justice or redress.
These events provide the answers to the often pressing question "what should I
do next?" They form the most real and important interaction that most people
have with the judicial power. While jurisprudential announcements of law in
appellate decisions are no less real for being abstract and difficult, such abstract
legal principles are not the sole or even primary constituents of the legal world.
The day to day realities of the legal profession and the abstract reasoning of
appellate courts are both part of a larger judicial world.99
Failure to appreciate the actual, perhaps mundane, embodiment of judi-
cial power is why abstract analyses of double jeopardy offense identity flounder.
Specifically, the independence of the concrete embodiments of judicial power
creates unique forms of practice that prohibit mechanically reliable translation
from the external world of events and legislation into the judiciary. While for-
eign facts and objects are regularly and of necessity introduced into the judici-
ary, the introduction is not automatic or seamless. For example, to the extent
that findings underlying legal policy are in the legislature's domain,' °° the judi-
ciary is to that extent removed from the "real" facts underlying statutory law.
But, as mentioned previously, there is another separation keeping the judicial
branch from getting to the facts. The actual offense event itself occurs outside
of the judicial proceedings.10' The event, being external to the proceedings,
must be reconstructed for the court.1°2 This reconstruction is not necessarily a
97 See generally 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 129 (2006).
98 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986) ("[Stare decisis is] the means by
which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled
and intelligible fashion. That doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles are
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the
integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.").
99 Weir v. United States, 339 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1964) (noting the "process of our applying
and adapting abstract law to the concrete facts of moment in the instant appeal...").
100 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 539 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Wis.
1982) (citing Nebbia v. New York, 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)).
101 Of course, some offenses, such as perjury or contempt, occur in the courtroom during a
judicial proceeding.
i0 See, e.g., C R Williams, Burdens and Standards in Civil Litigation, 25 SYDNEY L. REv. 165,
166 (2003) ("The aim of a trial is to reconstruct the facts of a past event so that the tribunal may
then apply the law to those facts.").
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distortion, nor is it necessarily truth preserving. 103 The typical way an external
offense event will come to the court will be through the familiar methods of
evidence presentation, witnesses, documents, evidentiary objects and so forth. 104
In addition to questions about perceptual reliability, first hand observers may be
biased or in conflict about what actually happened.105 Physical objects must be
authenticated following various rules.) 6 Though the rules are crafted to maxi-
mize a truthful connection between the object's status in the external event and
its role in the proceedings, the rules themselves are internal to the proceedings.
To use a familiar phrase, objects are "entered into evidence." Terms like "self-
authentication" hide the fact that evidence does not convey itself unassisted
from the extra-judicial setting into the court with transparent trustworthiness. 107
This skepticism about offense events is succinctly captured by the notion that
there are at least two sides to every story and is demonstrated by instances of
misperception or faulty representation, intentional or otherwise. 
108
These reflections are evidence of the separation between the judicial
world and other legally relevant contexts; we can now begin to speak of the
offense event as it occurred in the world and the offense event as it is repre-
sented in the judicial proceedings. 109 Reasoning from the facts of legal practice
has led to the conclusion that there is no guarantee of reliable representation.
The point of this discussion is not to search for an epistemic certainty by
looking for a necessary connection between the offense as represented in court
and the offense as it actually happened. Nor is the point to foster skepticism,
because such skepticism misses what is crucial-namely, that the judiciary is
independent, conceptually and factually, from legal events and processes that
take place in other branches of government or in the world outside.
If it is clear now that the contours of judicial power are importantly dif-
ferent from other parts of the legally relevant world, what more substantive ac-
103 Garcia v. Portuondo, 104 Fed. App'x 776, 780 (2d Cir. 2004) ("the passage of time may
impair a court's ability to reconstruct events or to find relevant facts").
104 United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 114 (3d Cir. 1986) ("In a criminal trial the factfinder is
required to reconstruct past events. Those events, which occurred in the exterior world, left their
own imprint on history and knowledge of them is attainable by methods within the common ex-
perience of mankind. Nevertheless our legal tradition surrounds the process of reconstructing past
events in a criminal trial with significant procedural safeguards.").
105 See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEo. L.J. 2475, 2475 (1993).
106 For example, see infra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
107 United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998, 1005 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Courts frequently must recon-
struct events when there has been no recordation of the proceedings under review.").
108 Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decision-
maker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1124, 1141 (2005) ("Both juror and judge
factfinding can be best characterized as story construction: People try to fit the evidence into a
plausible story of what happened. Evidence that does not fit a coherent story may be disbelieved
or devalued (that is, found not to be a 'fact').").
109 Swisher v. United States, 572 A.2d 85, 96 (D.C. 1990) ("[L]awyers must try to reconstruct
in the courtroom, after the fact, events which occurred at a different time and place.").
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count can be given of them? The first and most obvious places to turn to learn
more about the judicial world are to the various rules of that govern court pro-
ceedings. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, shape the judicial world
by governing (often with the help of interpretive decisions) one of the key fac-
tors in the determination of criminal liability - the admissibility of evidence, the
raw material from which the criminal offense is to be reconstructed.11 0 The
Rules further determine when something has been established for purposes of
the judicial proceedings."' Importantly, the Rules determine the scope of their
own applicability.1 2 Allowing for exceptions that the Rules themselves define,
the Rules "govern proceedings in the courts of the United States."'"13 In a simi-
lar spirit, the rules of civil, criminal, and appellate procedure create and shape
the world of judicial proceedings. These rules in fact create some of the objects
that are unique to the judiciary. 114 There are many examples. Some of the most
important include rules that govern the scope and applicability of the rules,"15
the meaning of the terms within the proceedings, 16 and the means by which the
offense event is introduced into the court." 7 In the double jeopardy context, for
example, while the indictment has to reflect the statutory elements of the of-
fense, 118 a bare recital of required elements does not do justice to the subtle and
contextualizing account of the offense that the prosecution will present. "19
The various rules help give form and substance to the judicial power,
but each court itself is the ultimate instantiation of judicial power. The "powers
are inherent in the sense that they exist because the court exists; the court is,
,,120therefore it has the powers reasonably required to act as an efficient court. ' ,While the judicial power inheres in different ways, 121 "[i]t has long been under-
110 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 600 series for witnesses, 700 series for experts, 800 series for out of
court statements.
III See, e.g., FED R. EvID. 900 series for authentication, 1000 series for best evidence.
112 FED. R. EVID. 101.
113 FED. R. EV1D. 101.
114 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. app. of forms.
115 FED. R. Civ. P. 1; FED. R. CIM. P. 1(a); FED. R. App. P. 1.
116 FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(b).
117 FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
118 See United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210, 220 (1920) ("An indictment
must charge each and every element of an offense.") (citing Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 584,
587 (1894)).
119 See infra Part V.A.
120 Pena v. Dist. Ct. of 2d Jud. Dist., 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo. 1984) (citing Jim R. Carrigan,
Inherent Powers & Finance, TPRAL, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 22, 22) (emphasis in original).
121 There are interesting differences between the inherent powers of state and federal courts.
For a survey of state specific inherent judicial powers, see Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and
Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92
Ky. L.J. 979 (2003). For a survey of federal courts' inherent power see Howard A. Matalon, The
Civil Indigent's Last Chance for Meaningful Access to the Federal Courts: The Inherent Power to
Mandate Pro Bono Publico, 71 B.U. L. REv. 545, 552-54 (1991).
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stood that '[clertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of
justice from the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed
with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others."
' 22
Courts possess many recognized inherent powers, ranging from purely legal
decision-making powers,'23 to procedural matters, 2" to the power to provide for
their own physical existence.25 Relevant to double jeopardy cases, courts have
the inherent power to compel the production of evidence necessary to recon-
struct the offense event inside the judicial proceedings. 126 From a practical point
of view, there is no other forum in which the offense event could be recon-
structed. 27
The full scope of the separation of the judicial power has not always
been clearly understood. Nevertheless, it should not be doubted - the sheer
physical existence of judicial institutions has resulted in unique institutions,
objects and practices that separate the judiciary from other legally relevant set-
tings. 128
V. A NEW ANALYSIS
Appreciating the full scope of judicial independence makes it possible
to offer a fuller account of the separation of powers doctrine and its implication
for double jeopardy analysis. The separation of powers doctrine is offended not
only when one branch of government intrudes, formally or functionally, upon
the role of another branch, but also when the factual preconditions for judicial
12 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)).
123 See, e.g., NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 702 (5th Cir.
1990), affd 501 U.S. 32 (1991) ("It is a given that federal courts enjoy a zone of implied power
incident to their judicial duty. From the Judiciary Act of 1789 forward its functional necessity has
not been seriously questioned. Rather, the task is one of defining its limits.").
124 See, e.g., Thomas v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 858 P.2d 113 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993)
("Such [inherent powers] 'include power to make, and enforce, reasonable rules for orderly pro-
cedure before courts[.]"') (citing Puckett v. Cook, 586 P.2d 721, 723 (Okla. 1978)).
125 See, e.g., Chief Judge of Eighth Judicial Circuit v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 401 So. 2d
1330, 1332 (Fla. 1981) ("Generally, court claims to courthouse space necessary to the perform-
ance of official court functions are paramount."). For a longer list of inherent powers, see Cham-
bers, 501 U.S. at 43-45.
126 In re Superior Court Order Dated Apr. 8, 1983, 338 S.E.2d 307, 308 (N.C. 1986) (holding
that a "judge has the inherent power to issue" an order directing "a banking corporation to disclose
to the district attorney a customer's bank account records upon finding that an examination of
such records would be in the best interests of justice").
127 See Robinson & Spellman, supra note 108, at 1138 (noting that "enormous costs of factfind-
ing probably mean that it cannot realistically be done anywhere other than at trial and post-trial
sentencing hearings before judge or jury").
128 Of course, even the most institutionally entrenched judicial independence is not guaranteed.
For historic threats to judicial independence, see Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judici-
ary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 565, 574-83 (1996).
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independence are encroached upon or weakened. When the judicial institutions
that serve as the embodiment of abstract judicial power are undermined, the
very ability to embody judicial power is lessened. It may be profitable for fu-
ture courts to consider more explicitly the roles that seemingly mundane judicial
processes and objects play in the manifestation and protection of judicial power.
At the very least, appreciation of the full ontological inventory of the judiciary
will enable a more sustained separation of powers analysis. Courts need not be
arrested at the level of mentioning abstract separation of powers principles - the
analysis can turn to the specific facts and objects of the judiciary in dispute
since those facts and objects are the logical prerequisites for the exercise of oth-
erwise abstract judicial power.
This understanding of the judiciary has significant implications for dou-
ble jeopardy law. It follows that the offense event must be limited solely to its
reconstruction in the judicial proceedings - courts can try a defendant only on
the offense so recreated because there is no longer any other offense. Reliance
on statutory definitions pursuant to Blockburger or legislative intent regarding
blameworthiness pursuant to the best commentator approaches, becomes suspect
when one realizes that statutes and legislative blameworthiness analyses are
external to the independent world of the judicial proceedings - the only pro-
ceedings ultimately relevant to offense determination and criminal liability.
The previous section was descriptive, demonstrating the existence of an
unsuspected and robust judicial independence. This section will be prescriptive
- it will discuss reasons why double jeopardy analysis should take into account
the full measure of that independence.
A. Individuals and Fairness: Why the Concepts Should Match the Practice
The judicial independence argued for herein is an explanatory fit with
actual practice. For example, it provides a mechanism for individuating and
identifying offense events. The offense in question is in a sense fixed by its
introduction into the proceedings. The prosecution will set the initially control-
ling definition of the offense in the charging document. 29 The adversarial na-
ture of the proceedings, however, prevents the prosecution from having the final
word. The defense is free to dispute the facts as the prosecution has defined
them. 30 In so doing, the defense will try to shape the framing of the offense
event by denying the charges and putting on its own version of events.13' Ulti-
129 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[T]he decision whether or not to prose-
cute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the prosecu-
tor' s] discretion.").
130 See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAm L.
REv. 2117 (1998) for an excellent account of the actual practice of prosecution and how it departs
from "elegant model of procedure that applies in principle ... " ld at 2120.
131 See, e.g., State v. McGee, 83 S.W.2d 98, 107 (Mo. 1935) ("Photographs and diagrams pur-
porting to reconstruct the surrounding conditions at the time of an offense are admissible in evi-
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mately, the burden rests on the prosecution to establish the offense within the
judicial proceeding. 132 The prosecution's failure to do so ends the proceeding
and renders questions of offense identity moot as should be the case when the
only legitimate stage for its existence has closed. 1
33
As noted previously, scholars give blameworthiness a prominent role in
determining offense sameness. 34 The real extent of judicial separation sug-
gests, however, that blameworthiness accounts are not as intuitively plausible as
they may seem. Legislatures create blameworthiness in the abstract. The indi-
vidual to which the statute is supposed to apply is essentially a variable to be
substituted into the statutory formula. Such blameworthiness is detached from
the specific individual who will ultimately face judgment in a given case. In
fact, it is beyond the scope of legislative competence to make individualized
determinations of blameworthiness.1 35  Therefore, it is surprising to note the
extent to which commentators would defer to legislative judgments of blame-
worthiness based on hypothetical defendants, when the judicial determination of
blameworthiness, of moral responsibility, applies to individuals in particular
cases. 136 Legislatures may tailor statutes and sentencing guidelines to allow for
sentences to accommodate the unique facts of each hypothetical case. But this
is a far cry from recognizing that the actual judgment of blameworthiness comes
solely in and through the judicial proceedings. 137
As demonstrated supra, the judicial proceedings create and contain the
only reconstruction of the facts on which criminal liability can be established.
Not only must any determination of blameworthiness be limited to the judicially
dence. Inaccuracies therein.., are generally more properly matter for impeachment, going to the
weight rather than the competency of the evidence.").
132 See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001) ("We have held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a State to convict a person of a crime without prov-
ing the elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.").
133 "[I]t is a well recognized principle of the law that courts of record can speak only by their
record and what does not so appear does not exist in law." State ex rel. Browning v. Oakley, 199
S.E.2d 752, 753 (W. Va. 1973).
134 In addition to Thomas's and Moore's accounts, see Finkelstein, supra note 40, at 379 for an
approach that would rely on identifying the relevant harm so as to justify and interference with
liberty that should be avoided as a presumption. That article also in part anticipates the confusion
on the part of judges in determining elements of blameworthiness. Id. at 394.
135 McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916) ("[I]t is not within the province
of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.").
136 United States v. Brown 381 U.S. 437, 445 (1965) ("[T]he Legislative Branch is not so well
suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness
of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons.").
137 "An adjudication of guilt is more than a factual determination that the defendant pulled a
trigger, took a bicycle, or sold heroin. It is a moral judgment that the individual is blameworthy."
United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting); see also State ex
rel. Hilbum v. Staeden, 91 S.W.3d 607, 610 (Mo. 2002) ("The entry of a judgment remains 'the
quintessential function of a court."') (citing Carr v. N. Kan. City Beverage Co., 49 S.W.3d 205,
207 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
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reconstructed facts out of necessity - there simply is no other forum - it must be
so limited in order to make the determination of blameworthiness truly and
fairly individualized. The reconstructed factual account is the record on which
the defendant will be tried. Improper reliance on legislative formulas for guilt
would be, in a very real sense, to try the defendant on something that is not in
the record. 138  Even on the most conventional accounts of double jeopardy and
the separation of powers, statutory schemata cannot comprehend the individual
defendant - the facts of a specific individual's offense do not exist in the stat-
ute.' 39 The defendant must be brought to trial by the executive who alleges that
the alleged offense matches the statutory language and there must be a trial be-
fore a court to reconstruct the specific facts of the alleged offense. Abstract
legislative determinations of blameworthiness give way to the concrete judicial
proceedings which become the only legitimate forum for determinations of
guilt.
The difficulties increase for the blameworthiness approach. Professor
Thomas, as noted earlier, defers to legislative judgments about blameworthi-
ness. Such legislative judgments, naturally, occur outside of the judicial
world. 140 Yet he acknowledges that the courts ultimately have to discern legisla-
tive intent about blameworthiness.141 This stands in some tension with his gen-
eral deference towards the legislature. 42  How is the court to tell which ele-
ments of a statute express judgments about blameworthiness and which do not -
which constitute impermissible, bad faith legislative excess? It is problematic to
grant total deference to the legislature on the core, morally salient, elements of
the statute while requiring the court to identify legislative intent about what
those elements are. 14 3 The court's judgment concerning whether or not a statu-
tory element is morally salient will be informed by its own belief about moral
138 See David P. Leonard, Different Worlds, Different Realities, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 863, 891
n. 111 (2001) ("Accurate reconstruction of facts is not the only function of a trial, but it is surely
the most important.").
139 Whatever else will go wrong, a double jeopardy analysis that relies improperly on legisla-
tive formulas instead of relying solely on the records of the judicial proceedings will be conceptu-
ally confused. It will confuse the offense itself with its reconstruction - objects and events with
words, descriptions and the documents of court. No matter how faithful judicial reconstructions
are to the actual event, they are fundamentally different things. The approaches advocated by
Professors Moore and Thomas, by trying to analyze the real event as opposed to the event recon-
structed, would individuate or find blame in the wrong places - events rather than the judicial
reconstruction of the events.
140 Bryan Dearinger, The State of the Nation, Not the State of the Record: Finding Problems
with Judicial "Review" of Eleventh Amendment Abrogation Legislation, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 421,
471 (2005) ("For example, legislators make laws differently than a court parses through facts and
records. Congress's facts, cases, and controversies involve innumerable parties and exist outside
the finite world of the judiciary.").
141 THOMAS, supra note 5, at 198-200.
142 Id.
143 For a survey of difficulties involved in identifying legislative intent see M.B.W. Sinclair,
Statutory Reasoning, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 299, 305-11 (1997).
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salience.' 44 The function of the judiciary is interpretation; it cannot be es-
caped,145 and it is present in every analysis of statutes and legislative history that
comes before the court. This is not a radical power, merely the power of judi-
cial review.'46 To deny the courts plenary use of this power is to deny them an
essential function. 147
The blameworthiness approach's problems are more than the denial of
an essential judicial function to the judiciary. What the approach implies is not
merely deference to legislative authority, but an all encompassing legal system
in which the legislature has made judgments about blameworthiness to which
the judiciary defers. However, there is no unifying authority that spans the di-
vide between the legislature and the judiciary that can ensure continuity between
judgments. Claims to the contrary presuppose a non-existent connection be-
tween the judiciary and the other branches, while neglecting the ground level
barriers that make reliable coordination between the powers suspect.'48 The
record as created in and by the judicial proceeding is the only proper metric -
factually and as a matter of fairness - for the determination of individual
blameworthiness.
Though discussions of double jeopardy jurisprudence are not merely
academic - one should not neglect that the selection of a particular double jeop-
ardy approach will have potential consequences for a defendant's liberty - an
interested reader will, as a general principle, want to come to an understanding
of a complex and intellectually challenging area of law. In his dissent in Grady
v. Corbin, Justice Scalia claimed that the court's holding would require too
144 To return to a previous example, the peripheral or non-morally salient elements might be the
time element of a vehicular homicide statute that prohibited vehicular homicide while driving
between 2:00 am and 6:00 am. Yet the time element could be something on which the legislature
decided to speak. Whether or not the time element represents a legislative judgment of blamewor-
thiness, strict liability, or merely legislative excess is something that the judiciary must interpret
using its own moral reasoning. Thomas proposes that courts use presumptions about legislative
intent, namely that "the same blameworthy act-type is only a single offense." THOMAS, supra note
5, at 199. But the problem appears again when considering when to use that presumption. It
would only be used when legislative intent about blameworthiness is not clear, but how is clarity
supposed to be determined at that earlier stage unless the court does some analysis of what is and
what is not blameworthy.
145 Bell v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 71 F.R.D. 349, 355 (D.N.H. 1976) ("[The j]udiciary[ I [has the]
explicit constitutional power to interpret the laws of the United States.").
146 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
147 Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: Independence
from What and Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 241, 241 (2001) ("Judicial independence starts
with an established judicial review, which allows the judiciary the opportunity to protect funda-
mental interests. That is the essential foundation.").
148 Another problem faces the blameworthiness accounts. It is possible for a legislature to
prohibit things that are not morally blameworthy. A legislature could criminalize an act on strict
liability grounds or in expression of a widely shared aesthetic. A pure blameworthiness test
would invalidate those laws. Of course the problems for commentators such as Thomas resurface:
who is to decide and how can that decision be coordinated between the separate branches of gov-
ernment.
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much of trial court judges. He assumed that their task is to determine what the
prosecution showed.149 Indeed, a judge is likely to be the foremost expert on
determining what the prosecution showed in the context of the judicial proceed-
ing. But legislative intent and moral blameworthiness, the mainstays of the
leading scholarly discussions, are not necessarily identical to what the prosecu-
tion shows. 150
The most careful double jeopardy commentary is devoted to principles
of event individuation: how is one to decide when an offense is the same, not
only under the law, but under criteria for event identity generally? An offense,
after all, is an event (or series of events) that will have physical and temporal
characteristics. Singling out that event with enough specificity to be able to
identify it and only it is not always a simple matter. Professor Moore's book
contains a detailed account of this sort of event analysis.' 5' The analysis focuses
on several problems, from distinguishing between act-types (what kind of
event) 5 2 and act-tokens (which particular event), 53 to giving criteria for eventidentity. 154
Moore's own proposal for event identity is, "For all things x and y, if x
and y are events, then x is identical to y if and only if x and y are exemplifyings
of the same property, by the same object, at the same time."' 155 On this view,
events are basically properties of objects - relationships, position or movement
in space time, or other properties. When those properties are exemplified (i.e.
when a specific instance of those properties occurs) by the same objects at the
same time, they are identical.
The reader will note how far this style of analysis is removed from the
usual subjects of legal studies. Further, consider how much this would ask of a
judge using such an approach to decide offense identity. It is unrealistic to ex-
pect that judges will apply Moore's complex, philosophical analysis of events to
a double jeopardy case. Nor do judges have to. Proper attention to the separa-
tion of powers principles in double jeopardy contexts allows for much simpler
and familiar event individuation. The separation of powers and the resultant
independence of the judiciary demands that offense identity for double jeopardy
purposes be done within the judicial proceedings. As shown previously, the
interaction of adversaries and powers within the judicial proceedings individu-
ates events in the only relevant manner.1 56 The legislature writes the statute
149 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 541 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
150 See a fuller discussion of legislative intent infra Part V.C.2.
151 In each chapter, Professor Moore slightly refines the analysis, but it is primarily an account
of how to understand criminally relevant events.
152 MooRE, supra note 5, at 325-55.
153 Id. at 356-90.
154 Id. at 369.
155 Id.
156 See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
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which defines the offense in the abstract. The executive introduces the offense
in court and offers the first application of the offense schema to the facts of the
case. The defense will contest and recast the application of law to fact. The judi-
ciary's task of fact recreation and ultimate judgment cannot and should not be
delegated to an authority more capable of implementing an event-
blameworthiness analysis.
57
B. Does Blockburger go beyond the Record?
Clearly, the approaches taken by commentators have failed to appreciate
the role that the separation of powers plays in double jeopardy law. Courts,
however, generally do not indulge in book-length philosophical explanations. 
158
Before condemning Blockburger-Dixon, it is worth taking a technical detour to
determine if the governing test determines offense identity and criminal liability
improperly by reliance on the statutory definition of an offense as opposed to
the offense as recreated in the courtroom and contextualized to the judicial pro-
ceedings.
In Dixon, then Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in part from Justice
Scalia's opinion, specifically on the point concerning from what source the de-
fined offense should be gleaned. The Chief Justice found an unbroken history
of the Court's reliance on the statutory elements; whereas he accused Justice
Scalia of looking towards the facts under the particular indictment 59 At least
one commentator has noted this disagreement between the Justices and suggests,
that in fact the Court now looks to the charging instrument as opposed to the
statute book. 160
Though it is tempting to conclude that the charging instrument is con-
trolling for double jeopardy offense identity purposes, there are some difficulties
with that conclusion.161 First, it is not clear if Justice Scalia meant to create a
rule that necessarily incorporates the charging instrument. In Dixon, defendant
Dixon was arrested and indicted for a drug offense. 162 Based on that arrest and
indictment, he was convicted for criminal contempt for violation of a condition
of release regarding a previous, unrelated offense.163  The condition specified
157 Presumably factfinders could become educated about principles of event individuation,
though, it seems unrealistic to assume that judges, let alone juries, will ever be in a position to
adopt Professor Moore's sophisticated analysis.
158 After all, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
159 United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 716-17 (1993) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)..
160 Ross, supra note 3, at n.76.
161 It is tempting, of course, because it would show double jeopardy jurisprudential reliance on
an important fact of the judicial proceedings. The charging instrument is indexed to the proceed-
ing; indeed, it only exists because of and within the proceedings.
162 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 691.
163 Id. at 691-92.
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that he was not to commit "any criminal offense."' ' 4 The trial for the drug of-
fense was dismissed by the lower court believing that the contempt conviction
barred the subsequent drug prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. 165 The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that since the drug offense did not contain any
elements other than those already present in the contempt conviction, Block-
burger barred it.' 66
Four of the five counts of defendant Foster's domestic assault offenses,
however, were not barred by his previous conviction for violation of a civil pro-
tection order forbidding him from assaulting his former wife. 167 Those four
counts in the assault conviction specified elements that were not present in the
violation of the civil protection order and thus passed Blockburger scrutiny.
Under the particular facts of Dixon, the contempt citation lacked a list of statu-
tory elements to which one could appeal. The Chief Justice noted the difference
between statutory and contempt offenses 168 and supposed that Justice Scalia had
to then focus on a greater and lesser included offense analysis in order to avoid
clear conflict with precedent. Yet, Justice Scalia's reasoning may be limited to
the facts of the particular case since there were no clear statutory elements under
which to analyze contempt (contempt requires a violation of a judicial order, not
a statute). 169 Justice Scalia addressed this point. He wrote: "[o]bviously, Dixon
could not commit an 'offence' [sic] under [the statute authorizing contempt]
until an order setting out conditions was issued. The statute by itself imposes no
legal obligations on anyone."' 170 Accordingly, Justice Scalia's reliance on the
indictment may reflect only these unusual circumstances.
However, even if we assume that Justice Scalia meant to change the fo-
cus from the statutory elements to the indictment, it is difficult to say which of
the Dixon justices joined him in that opinion. Justice Scalia's opinion on this
point, part I1, was joined by only Justice Kennedy. Justices O'Connor and
Thomas joined the Chief Justice's dissent from part III. In part 11B of his dis-
sent, Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens rejected a focus on only the statu-
tory elements, 17 ' but did so with an eye towards restoring Grady's same conduct
test, 172 not while making a distinction between statutory elements versus facts
from the indictment. The other Justices did not focus on the distinction. There-
fore there were possibly four justices who may have allowed for the offense to
164 Id. at 691.
165 Id. at 692.
166 Id. at 700.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 716-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
169 See generally 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.
170 Id. at 697.
171 Id. at 735 (White, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 740 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that overruling Grady was "both unwarranted and
unwise").
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be defined by the indictment in this case in which there was no good statutory
reference.
It seems unlikely that from this fractured opinion the Court departed
from its historical reliance on the statutory elements. 73  Therefore, the Block-
burger-Dixon test, like the commentator approaches critiquing it, relies imper-
missibly on statutory abstractions for determination of offense identity and
criminal liability. Ignoring the interaction of separate government powers and
the adversarial reconstruction of offenses in favor of rote application of legisla-
tive formulas unjustly disadvantages a defendant who is bound by the judicial
proceedings. It would be fairer for courts to realize that the legislative formula
is, by institutional design, transformed by its introduction into the proceedings
into a fact specific, individual test of justice. 74
C. Challenges
1. Rationality and Relativism
This Note's focus on the judiciary's true independence, though justified
by a history of neglect, has the potential of erring in the opposite manner. The
judiciary is institutionally distinct, and institutions, as shown previously, have
logical prerequisites and consequences.175 However, that distinctness is not so
radical that elements of the judiciary cannot interact with the rest of the
world. 176 The judiciary is composed of the same sorts of people and objects that
make up other human institutions. Moreover, judicial judgment is not an unfa-
miliar power: it is the application of the fact finder's reasoning ability to the
particular facts before the judiciary. 177
The rationality of human actors extends across all legally relevant fora
and into the heart of judicial institutions where judges routinely exercise a ra-
173 Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980) ("We recognized that the Blockburger test fo-
cuses on the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on the
actual evidence to be presented at trial."). But see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
174 Some courts have taken steps in this direction. See infra Part VL
175 The institutional analyses advocated by legal process theory and other theoretical ap-
proaches differ importantly from the institutional analysis presented in this Note. This Note is
concerned with the narrower legal institutions (both physical and formal) and their structural
impact on judicial proceedings. Other approaches are more concerned with broader philosophical
biases or methodologies that result from institutional pressures on human actors within the judici-
ary. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1393, 1403 (1996).
176 Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 341 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 425
("The modem view of separation of powers rejects the metaphysical abstractions upon which Mr.
Nixon would rely, and reverts instead to a more pragmatic, flexible, functional approach.").
177 See, e.g., Joel Levin, The Concept of the Judicial Decision, 33 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 208
(1983).
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tionality that forestalls fears of relativism 178 For example, a familiar judicial
power is the ability to rationally test legislation. 179 Rationality tests are familiar
in the due process and equal protection contexts'80 and generally involve two
parts: 1) asking about the legitimacy of the government's goal, then 2) asking if
its means of accomplishing that goal are rationally related to that goal.'8 In the
double jeopardy context, the ability to rationally test legislation plays an impor-
tant role.' 8 2  A rational basis test suggests a way to limit the multiplication of
elements: a court can test if the distinguishing elements of a particular homicide
statute are rationally related to the legitimate governmental goal.' 83 This is one
obvious check on legislative deference that doesn't involve questions of blame-
worthiness' 84 or event individuation because rationality testing is well within the
ability of the judiciary. 185
The institutional facts that shape the judicial proceedings do result in a
world of practice and objects unique to the judiciary. However, the judiciary is
not so alien as to be incomprehensible from the outside. It is ultimately a ra-
tional world that fits comfortably into the rest of the legal process.
Nor is there a slippery slope towards either an expansion of the judicial
world or a multiplicity of other unique, independent legal forums. Although at
first blush this Note may appear to offer an approach that is more radical than
178 See, e.g., Allan C. Hutchinson, Work-in-Progress: Gadamer, Tradition, and the Common
Law, 76 Cin.-KENT L. REv. 1015, 1048 (2000); Bobby Jindal, Relativism, Neutrality, and Tran-
scendentalism: Beyond Autonomy, 57 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258 (1997); but see Nancy Levit, Criti-
cal of Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit, and Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 795, 801-02 (1999).
179 See, e.g., Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 598 (7th Cir. 2003) (Ripple, J., concurring) ("the
well-known and frequently applied rational basis test of constitutional analysis").
180 Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 307 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the rationality
test is in fact the same for both).
181 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 145,
152 (D.D.C. 2003).
182 In the criminal collateral estoppel context the test should feature "realism and rationality."
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
183 The particular offense may be vehicular homicide or negligent homicide, in which case the
distinguishing element would be use of a vehicle or negligence, respectively. See supra notes 37-
43 and accompanying text; Amar, supra note 4.
184 Another problem faces the blameworthiness accounts. It is possible for a legislature to
rationally prohibit things that are not morally blameworthy. A legislature could criminalize some-
thing on strict liability grounds or in an expression of a widely shared aesthetic. A strict blame-
worthiness test would strike those laws down. Of course the problematic questions for commenta-
tors such as Thomas, supra note 5, resurface: who is to decide and how can that decision be coor-
dinated between the separate worlds of the law.
185 See Susan R. Klein, Double Jeopardy's Demise, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1048-50 (2000) for
a review of Thomas's book and an account that would ask the judiciary to check legislative de-
terminations of blameworthiness by establishing its own determinations of blameworthiness. The
author eventually settles on a "same conduct" and blameworthiness test that shares the problems
of Thomas's and Moore's tests and is the opposite of the independence argued for in this paper.
Id. at 1037.
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needed, history shows that such an approach is necessary. 186 Double jeopardy
law on the question of offense identity has been particularly confused; few peo-
ple seem satisfied with Blockburger, and alternative proposals abound. 87 Im-
portantly, the nature of the problem calls for recognition of the judiciary's limits
in certain areas; whereas, regarding other prominent constitutional questions, the
judiciary is inherently suited to the task. The very phrase "due process" refer-
ences the processes that are familiar to the judicial world and that the judiciary
in large part creates. 88 Courts are the arbiters of equal protection.' 89 Tests used
in Fourth 19° and Eighth Amendment' 9' contexts, being within the traditional,
rationality-analysis powers of the judiciary, are perfectly amenable to judicial
treatment.
Therefore, though judicial separation is a brute fact, its recognition need
not be the primary analytical tool in every field of jurisprudence. The partici-
pants will likely work within the judicial proceeding and, finding no historical
failures of analysis and interaction between powers similar to those present in
double jeopardy contexts, will not have to invoke a thesis which their actions
presuppose. In the double jeopardy context, however, such invocation is vital
for understanding the historic failures of analysis.
2. Legislative Intent
Though, as discussed earlier, there is a danger of complete deference to
the legislature,192 some deference seems reasonable. The statute will no doubt
play a large role in the proceedings, and the court will be faced with the chal-
lenge of incorporating it into the world of the judicial proceedings.
The primary challenge faced by the robust separation of powers solution
to double jeopardy problems espoused in this Note is one of importation. This
potential problem is perhaps best seen in judicial use of legislative intent, which
suggests more of a removal from the judicial proceedings than other external
186 See discussion of the failings of traditional separation of powers analysis supra Part IV.A-B.
187 Ross, supra note 3, at 257.
188 Cf Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 522 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(noting "the judiciary's unshakeable commitment to the ideal of due process").
189 See Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1567 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The
historic competence of the federal judiciary to address questions of First Amendment freedoms
and equal protection is clear.") (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962)).
190 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) ("The point of the Fourth Amendment
[... ] is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate ... ").
191 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) ("To be sure, 'the Constitution contemplates
that in the end [a court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptabil-
ity' of a given punishment.") (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
192 See supra Part V.A for a discussion about the impropriety of legislative determinations of
blameworthiness.
[Vol. 109
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol109/iss2/11
DOUBLE JEOPARDY LAW
items because legislative intent would, presumably, be as foreign to the judicial
world as anything in the separation of powers context could be. Certainly the
deference to the legislature is easy enough to explain under this model: the ju-
diciary, exercising its own power, simply adopts its belief regarding what the
legislature meant. 9 3  More problematic is the suggestion that the intent can be
directly incorporated. If it is possible for a court to adopt the legislative intent
behind a double jeopardy offense-defining statute directly from the halls of the
legislature, unreconstructed and unaltered through the barriers of the judicial
proceedings, the case for the judiciary as a unique and independent forum for
offense determination would be weakened.
One should therefore assume that a judge following Blockburger will
compare the offense charged in the indictment with the statutory elements and
not with the offense as reconstructed in court. 194 But is there really any differ-
ence? The prosecutor will no doubt track the language of the statute faithfully.
There is a difference, however, and it goes to the very heart of branch roles and
interactions. The statutory language describing the offense in the abstract does
not simply impose itself into the court proceedings. The statute is introduced
into court by the prosecutor, the independent representative of the executive.
95
The executive's contextualizing account is partisan and must be checked by the
independent judiciary. 196 Nor do courts simply, during the proceedings, ask the
legislature its intent with the answer then becoming contemporaneously deter-
minative - problems of statutory construction are well known. 197 The various
facts and documents presented in the proceedings transfer the intent to the court,
and that intent is filtered through the rules and procedures of court just like
every other item of relevance. 
198
193 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (deferring to legislative intent in
classifying a proceeding as civil or criminal).
194 See supra Part V.B for a discussion of the Blockburger-Dixon approach's reliance on the
statute.
195 State v. Iowa Dist. Court for Johnson County, 568 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Iowa 1997) ("[a]
prosecutor is not subject to judicial supervision in determining what charges to bring and how to
draft accusatory pleadings, but is protected from judicial oversight by the doctrine of separation of
powers") (citing 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prosecuting Attorneys § 21, at 134 (1997)).
196 Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication 93 CAL. L. REv. 1585, 1597-98 (2005).
197 See, e.g., Shillaber v. Waldo, 1 Haw. 21, 23 (1847) ("It is, beyond all question, one of the
most difficult tasks that man ever undertook to perform, to write a statute of any length, the mean-
ing of which shall be capable of only one construction. It is a task so great, that perhaps it has
never yet been fully accomplished. I remember to have heard that ripe scholar, and great ex-
pounder and teacher of the law, Judge Story, once say, that he had been the framer of a great many
statutes, which he thought perfectly clear; but no sooner had they gone into operation than up
sprung a multitude of disputes and difficulties concerning their meaning, and what was more
wonderful, those disputes and difficulties were not without foundation. Such is the experience of
the whole judicial world .... ).
198 The relevant physical pieces of evidence come into the court in the context of one of the
parties' case. Their presentation and immersion in that context suffices to prove the point that they
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Whatever case may be made for the original foreignness of legislative
intent, its existence in the judiciary is governed by the same rules, objects and
processes that have been shown to create and sustain the independent and insti-
tutionally distinct judicial power. Legislative intent, thus incorporated, does not
diminish the robustness of judicial independence because by incorporation it
becomes internal to the judicial proceedings.
VI. THE HISTORICAL RECORD
The proper approach to determining offense identity is one that recog-
nizes the role of the judicial proceedings in creating the only relevant offense in
the first place. This Note has argued that courts should consider the entirety of
the proceedings, including the particular wording of the charging document, the
factual record, the conduct of the parties, the depositions and pleadings, the trial
testimony, the rulings below, the trial transcripts-in short: everything that
makes u the world in which the offense is recreated and in which the defendant
is tried. 19
The general history of uncritical deference to the legislature has not
prevented some courts from adopting standards that, either explicitly or implic-
itly, rely on a court's robust independence. To the extent that courts have
adopted such standards, the account presented herein receives a measure of em-
pirical support.
There are numerous contexts where courts have recognized the bounda-
ries and autonomy of the judicial world. In motion to dismiss contexts, "review
is strictly limited to the four corners of the complaint. '' 2°° This is likewise the
case with certain affidavits, 20 1 cases of effectiveness of counsel,2°2 collateral
attacks on sentencing, 2°3 and contracts.
204
would be unintelligible but for the contextualizing powers of the proceedings. After all, how will
the court know what the object is unless it is informed by one of the parties, and how can the party
do that except in the form of pleadings, under rules of evidence, using reconstructed event histo-
ries and so forth?
199 However, this world does not include what the judge had for breakfast, pace a famous legal
realist position. See Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 24 (1931). This
Note's approach is distinguishable from legal realism by not questioning that decisions are made
in reference to legal principles or for sound legal reasons. It merely disputes where those legal
principles and reasons are ultimately grounded. This Note claims that the relevant legal princi-
ples (in contrast to the moods of a judge) are grounded within the independent reality of the judi-
cial proceeding. A legal realist approach would view those principles as stemming from other
societal or philosophical bases. While the judicial world can certainly incorporate principles
stemming from extra-judicial world sources, it is only through that incorporation into the frame-
work of the judicial proceeding that the principles have any legal effect.
200 Montero v. Wash. State Patrol, No. C05-1092C, 2005 WL 3500832 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21,
2005).
201 United States v. Lazu-Rivera, Criminal No. 03-249(JAG), 2004 WL 3171128, at *12
(D.P.R. Dec. 29, 2004) ("judicial review of the wiretap affidavit 'is limited to the four comers of
the affidavit') (citing United States v. Nelson-Rodrfguez, 319 F.3d 12, 33 n.3 (1st Cir. 2003)).
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On the appellate level, where double jeopardy jurisprudential determi-
nations are made, there is equally a reliance on the facts of the judicial proceed-
ings. 205 Even in de novo review contexts, the record below is a limiting factor in
that the proper presentations and objections determine the question presented for
appellate consideration. 206 Although the court may research case law, treatises,
and the like in order to make legal determinations, evidence is neither taken on
appeal nor is there the evidentiary representation of events, save what is dis-
cernable from the record below. 2°7 These limitations demonstrate the role that
the actual facts of the judicial proceedings play. This is an important step in
giving substance to the separation of the judicial world which is ultimately prob-
lematic for double jeopardy purposes.
In analyzing the specifics of various double jeopardy cases, one should
note the difference between what courts have said and what courts have actually
done. Courts have refused to limit the defining context of an offense. In Texas
v. Cobb,208 the Court, citing Blockburger, wrote that "we have recognized in
other contexts [referring to Blockburger] that the definition of an 'offense' is not
necessarily limited to the four corners of a charging instrument." 2°9 The impli-
cations of the Court's statement are important. Not only does the Court recog-
nize the relevance of the charging instrument, but it recognizes the larger con-
text in which the charging instrument exists - implicitly looking to the proceed-
ings in their entirety. As noted previously, adversarial give and take alters the
offense definition set forth by the charging instrument which is further supple-
mented by every other piece of relevant evidence.21l
202 State v. Lewis, No. 04AP-1112, 2005 WL 3547961 at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29,
2005.) (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2005) ("In determining whether trial counsel's assistance was ineffec-
tive, an appellate court's review is strictly limited to the record that was before the trial court.").
203 Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 182-83 (1958).
204 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:5 (4th ed.).
205 Ullah v. State, 679 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("It is elemental that an
appellate court may not consider matters outside the record, and when a party refers to such mat-
ters in its brief, it is proper for the court to strike same.").
206 State ex rel. Kaufman v. Zakaib, 207 W. Va. 662, 671 (2000) ("If the record does not reveal
an error, a court will conclude that one does not exist: It will be presumed, where the record is
silent, that a court of competent jurisdiction performed its duty in all respects as required by law.")
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
207 John J. Watkins, Price Marshall, Modest Proposal: Simplify Arkansas Appellate Practice by
Abolishing the Abstracting Requirement, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 37, 38 (2000) ("the court does not know
the facts, and it wants to ... [a]ppellate courts do not try cases anew; their review is limited to
what transpired in the trial court, and the record at trial becomes the record on appeal") (quoting,
in part, KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 238 (1960)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
208 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
209 Id. at 172-73.
210 See supra Parts V.A. and V.C.2 concerning definition setting by adversarial give and take.
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Recall the controlling language of Blockburger: "[tihe test to be applied
to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provi-
sion requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.",21' The his-
tory of interpretive emphasis has been on the phrase "additional fact," but the
import of the need for proof should not be lost. As demonstrated by the central-
ity of the Rules of Evidence, proof, the method and elements of a presented
case, is a fundamental part of the judicial world.21 2 The importance of proof
gives substance to the claim that the judicial proceedings are an independent and
separate world, ultimately determinative of offense identity for double jeopardy
213purposes. To prove something in a court of law is to bring it into existence
for the purposes of the judicial world.
Consider, for example, the case Diaz v. United States.21 4 A month after
Diaz was convicted of assault and battery, his victim died and the prosecution
subsequently brought a homicide charge to which Diaz pled double jeopardy.
Before stating its conclusion the Court went into a discussion of the facts of
Diaz's homicide trial, what the record showed and what the attorneys pre-
sented.21 5 The Court affirmed his homicide conviction stating that: "[a]t the
time of the trial for the [assault and battery] the death had not ensued, and not
until it did ensue was the homicide committed ... [tihen, and not before, was it
possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that offense.- 216 A plausible way to
view Diaz is to see it as restricting jeopardy to what the prosecution could
prove. Obviously, before the victim died, there was no way for the prosecution
to prove murder. The prosecution's construction of the case defined whether the
defendant was in jeopardy. But the prosecution's presentation and proof - its
entire case - exists solely in the context of the judicial proceedings. Because the
judicial proceedings determine something so central to double jeopardy cases,
the relevance of the judicial world's reality and independence is clear: double
jeopardy law depends on the facts and processes of an independent and separate
judiciary.
To that end, even more suggestive is the language found in Sealfon v.
United States.2 17 In this criminal res judicata case, 2 8 the Court considered
211 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (emphasis added).
212 Blacks Law Dictionary 1251 (8th ed. 2004) ("Proof... 1. The establishment or refutation
of an alleged fact by the evidence; the persuasive effect of evidence in the mind of a fact-finder..
. 2. Evidence that determines the judgment of a court .... ").
213 Indeed, the truth of the thesis implies that the judicial proceedings are determinative of
nearly all that is legally relevant within the judicial world. This Note's focus on double jeopardy
should not be seen as a denial of the separation thesis's applicability to other areas of law. How-
ever, for the unique problem posed by double jeopardy jurisprudence, and for the manifest neces-
sity of a separation thesis in explanation, see infra Parts IV and V.
214 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
215 Id. at 444.
216 Id. at 449.
217 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948).
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whether a previous acquittal on conspiracy was a bar to a subsequent prosecu-
tion on the substantive offense. The Court held that "[t]he instructions under
which the verdict was rendered, however, must be set in a practical frame and
viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings. 21 9 Indeed, the
Court spent most of its brief opinion considering the facts presented in the un-
derlying proceedings. "All the circumstances of the proceedings" is precisely
the measure for which this Note has argued. 220
The next step would be recognition of the independent and substantive
reality of the judicial world by more explicitly and narrowly linking determina-
tion of offenses to the facts presented in the proceeding. Such an explicit link-
age may be too much to ask of a Supreme Court that has never fully clarified its
jurisprudence on this issue. However, some courts have adopted a test for of-
fense identity that is determined by a standard inescapably indexed to the judi-
cial proceedings, namely, the evidence presented at trial. This "same evidence"
test is used by some courts and has been confused with the Blockburger test by
others.22' This test holds that in order to determine whether a defendant is be-
ing prosecuted twice for the same act or transaction "[t]he proper standard ... is
to ask whether the actual evidence needed to convict the defendant in the first
trial is the same as the evidence needed to obtain the second conviction. ' '222 In
addition to the Sixth Circuit, several states have adopted the "same evidence"
test.
223
218 For the relationship between criminal res judicata and double jeopardy see E.H. Schopler,
Annotation, Modern Status of Doctrine of res judicata in Criminal Cases, 9 A.L.R.3d 203 § 4[a],
[b] & [c] (1966). In double jeopardy cases, the factual determinations of the proceedings would
apply to the entirety of the offense and its definition. In res judicata contexts, however, the pro-
ceedings need not determine the totality of the offense since res judicata acts as a bar towards
subsequent prosecution on smaller elements of the defense. State v. Thompson, 39 N.W.2d 637,
640-41 (Iowa 1949).
219 332 U.S. at 579.
220 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 511 (1990), is worth mentioning again. To some extent,
Grady's "same conduct" test is suggestive of a more contextualizing standard. Though Grady
would, like Blockburger, look to elements outside of the judicial proceedings (the same conduct
for Grady in addition to the statutory elements for Blockburger), the same conduct test is more
naturally aligned with the approach presented in this Note because proving the sameness of con-
duct would almost surely involve a more sustained engagement with the judicial proceeding -
more would have to be shown and reconstructed for the court.
221 See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70 n.24 (1978); Williams v. Warden, 422 F.3d
1006, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2005); State v. Caldwell, No. 21835-0-1II, 2005 WL 2739497, at *1
(Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2005); Marquardt v. State, 882 A.2d 900, 931 (Md.App. 2005); but see
Grady, 495 U.S at 522, n. 12; State v. Rodriguez, 116 P.3d 92, 101 (N.M. 2005).
222 Rashad v. Burt, 108 F.3d 677, 680 (6th. Cir. 1997). How exactly the Sixth Circuit can de-
part from the holding of Dixon is not clear. Relying on pre-Dixon case law, the Court attempted
to distinguish the successive prosecution issue presented from the multiple prosecution issue that
it took to be Blockburger'slDixon's sole concern. But see supra note 13.
223 See Appendix B; State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175, 1177 (La. 1980) (distinguishing between
the evidence needed for conviction and the evidence presented at trial).
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The record has established a clear countertrend to Blockburger's me-
chanical, statutory test. Courts have been willing to link, both implicitly and
explicitly, the determination of offenses and criminal liability to the actual pro-
ceedings. Recognition of the full significance of separation of powers - the
role of the judiciary in offense reconstruction - will hopefully give impetus to
this countertrend and further double jeopardy analyses that provide for truly
individualized judgment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Governmental powers are separated in a different manner and to a dif-
ferent extent than traditional analyses have suggested. The separation has cre-
ated unique and importantly autonomous legal institutions that provide the form
and substance of judicial proceedings. These judicial proceedings are the only
forum in which criminal offense events can be reconstructed, and, accordingly,
the only forum in which an individual can be judged. Legislative determina-
tions of guilt in the form of statutory formulas, must be properly incorporated
into the judicial proceedings. The prosecutor's account - the introduction and
contextualization of the elements of the offense and the facts of the crime - re-
places legislative abstractions as the relevant measure of criminal liability. The
danger of ignoring the richer account of the judiciary in favor rote application of
statutory or legislative intent tests is the danger of trying the individual defen-
dant on something other than his individual facts - of trying the defendant on
something outside the only possible record.
This Note has attempted to address two difficulties of contemporary ju-
risprudence - the paucity of separation of powers analytical depth and the con-
fusion of double jeopardy law. The two are joined by an unwillingness to ex-
tend separation of powers discussions into a more detailed account of judicial
institutions, their powers and presuppositions. Contrary to the alternate ap-
proaches discussed, this Note provides an explanation of the actual working of
judicial processes and matches those processes to our best intuitions of struc-
tural fairness. While the arguments may have seemed unfamiliar at times, it is a
mark in their favor that courts have arrived at similar conclusions. It is hoped
that this Note will help interested readers reach similar conclusions in the future.
APPENDIX A: STATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY SURVEY
Alabama: "That no person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; but courts may, for reasons fixed by law, discharge
juries from the consideration of any case, and no person shall gain an advantage
by reason of such discharge of the jury." ALA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Alaska: "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
No person shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to be a witness against
himself." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9.
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Arizona: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give
evidence against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
ARIZ. CONST. art. H1, § 10.
Arkansas: "[N]o person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in
jeopardy of life or liberty; but if, in any criminal prosecution, the jury be divided
in opinion, the court before which the trial shall be had, may, in its discretion,
discharge the jury, and commit or bail the accused for trial, at the same or the
next term of said court.. ." ARK. CONST. art. HI, § 8.
California: "Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense.. ." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
Colorado: "No person shall.., be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. If the jury disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after the verdict, or if
the judgment be reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to
have been in jeopardy." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18.
Connecticut: "Although the Connecticut constitution contains no spe-
cific double jeopardy provision, the due process and personal liberty guarantees
of article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution include protection
against double jeopardy . . . § 8, of the Connecticut constitution provides in
relevant part: 'No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law ... § 9, of the Connecticut constitution provides: 'No
person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted
by law."' State v. Ferguson, 796 A.2d 1118, 1135 (Conn. 2002) (internal quota-
tion marks altered and citations omitted).
Delaware: "[N]o person shall be for the same offense twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb.. ." DEL. CONST., art. H1, § 8.
Florida: "No person shall be... twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense[.. .]" FLA. CONST. art. H, § 9.
Georgia: "No person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more
than once for the same offense except when a new trial has been granted after
conviction or in case of mistrial." GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, XVIII
Hawaii: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy .... ." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Idaho: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
." IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13.
Illinois: "No person shall be... twice put in jeopardy for the same. of-
fense." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Indiana: "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same of-
fense." IND. CONST. art. I, § 14.
Iowa: "No person shall after acquittal, be tried for the same offence."
I.C.A. CONST. art. I, § 12. See also State v. Daniels 588 N.W.2d 682,
683 (Iowa 1998) ("In several recent cases this court has observed that our
merger statute, Iowa Code section 701.9, codifies the protection from cumula-
tive punishment secured by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution.").
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Kansas: "No person shall... be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense." KAN. CONST. B. OF R. § 10.
Kentucky: "No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeop-
ardy of his life or limb.. ." KY. CONST. § 13.
Louisiana: "No person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same
offense, except on his application for a new trial, when a mistrial is declared, or
when a motion in arrest of judgment is sustained." LA. CONST. art. I, § 15. See
also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 596 (2006).
Maine: "Section 8. No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb. ME. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Maryland: Taylor v. State, 381 Md. 602, 610 (Md. 2004) ("despite the
lack of a double jeopardy clause in the Maryland Constitution, the Maryland
common law provides protection to individuals from being twice put into jeop-
ardy").
Massachusetts: "In recent years, the Supreme Judicial Court has en-
gaged in increased speculation as to whether the Massachusetts double jeopardy
rule is simply a common law protection or rather has a State constitutional
grounding." Com. v. Arriaga, 691 N.E.2d 585, 587 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998);
Michigan: "Sec. 15. No person shall be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15.
Minnesota: "No person shall be... put twice in jeopardy of punish-
ment for the same offense.. ." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Mississippi: "No person's life or liberty shall be twice placed in jeop-
ardy for the same offense; but there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on
the merits to bar another prosecution." MISS. CONST. art. I, § 22.
Missouri: "[N]or shall any person be put again in jeopardy of life or
liberty for the same offense, after being once acquitted by a jury; but if the jury
fail to render a verdict the court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury and
commit or bail the prisoner for trial at the same or next term of court; and if
judgment be arrested after a verdict of guilty on a defective indictment or infor-
mation, or if judgment on a verdict of guilty be reversed for error in law, the
prisoner may be tried anew on a proper indictment or information, or according
to the law." MO. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
Montana: "No person shall be... again put in jeopardy for the same
offense previously tried in any jurisdiction." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25. See
also MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504(1) (2006).
Nebraska: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Nevada: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. . ." NEV.. CONST. art. I, § 8.
New Hampshire: "No subject shall be liable to be tried, after an acquit-
tal, for the same crime or offense." N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 16.
New Jersey: "No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same of-
fense." N.J. CONST. art. 1, 1 11. See also State v. Capak, 638 A.2d 918, 919
n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (Our state constitution literally protects
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only against reprosecution "after acquittal," N.J. CONST. art. I, 1 11, but has
been consistently interpreted to be co-extensive with, and to provide no greater
protection than, the federal double jeopardy clause.)
New Mexico: "[N]or shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense; and when the indictment, information or affidavit upon which any
person is convicted charges different offenses or different degrees of the same
offense and a new trial is granted the accused, he may not again be tried for an
offense or degree of the offense greater than the one of which he was con-
victed." N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
New York: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense. . ." N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6. "This has been codified in CPL
40.20(1), which states that 'a person may not be twice prosecuted for the same
offense."' People v. Brignoni, 701 N.Y.S.2d 253, 256 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999)
(internal quotation marks altered).
North Carolina: State v. Ezell, 582 S.E.2d 679, 682 (N.C.App. 2003)
("Article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution does not expressly
prohibit double jeopardy, but the courts have included it as one of the 'funda-
mental and sacred principle[s] of the common law, deeply imbedded in criminal
jurisprudence' as part of the 'law of the land."' (internal quotation marks altered
and citations omitted).
North Dakota: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense... " N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12. See also "No person can be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense, nor can any person be subjected to a second
prosecution for a public offense for which he has once been prosecuted and
convicted, or acquitted, or put in jeopardy, except as is provided by law for new
trials." N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-07.
Ohio: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.
Oklahoma: "Nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy of life or
liberty for the same offense." OKLA. CONST. art. HI, § 21.
Oregon: "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence
[sic].. ." OR. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Pennsylvania: "No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.. ." PA. CONST. art I, § 10
Rhode Island: "No person shall be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy." R.I. CONST. art. I, § 7.
South Carolina: No person shall be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty.. ." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12.
South Dakota: "No person shall be ... twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense." S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
Tennessee: "That no person shall, for the same offence, be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." TENN. CONST. art I, § 10.
Texas: "No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy
of life or liberty, nor shall a person be again put upon trial for the same offense,
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after a verdict of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction." TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 14.
Utah: "[N]or shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense." UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 12.
Vermont: "Defendant also cited the Vermont Constitution, Chapter I,
Article 10. This Court has previously declined to imply a double jeopardy provi-
sion therein .... Defendant did not refer to 13 V.S.A. § 6556 (statutory bar to
subsequent prosecution for same offense after an acquittal on the merits), or to
Vermont common law. . ." State v. Ramsay, 499 A.2d 15, 17 (Vt. 1985) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
Virginia: "[A] man... shall not... be put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense." VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Washington: "No person shall be... twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9.
West Virginia: "[N]or shall any person, in any criminal case, be com-
pelled to be a witness against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy of life or lib-
erty for the same offence." W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
Wisconsin: "[N]o person for the same offense may be put twice in
jeopardy of punishment.. ." WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Wyoming: "No person shall be ... twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. If a jury disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after a verdict, or if the
judgment be reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have
been in jeopardy." WYO. CONST. art. I, § 11.
APPENDIX B: STATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY TEST SURVEY
STATES THAT FOLLOW BLOCKBURGER
Alabama: State v. Esco, 911 So.2d 48, 49-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)
("Alabama has applied the Blockburger test to determine whether two offenses
are the 'same' under the Alabama Constitution.").
Arizona: Hernandez v. Superior Court In and For County of Mari-
copa, 880 P.2d 735, 741-42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) ("Arizona's courts ordinarily
interpret this clause in conformity to the interpretation given by the United
States Supreme Court to the same clause in the federal constitution....
[D]ecisions of the United States Supreme Court have great weight in interpret-
ing those provisions of the state constitution which correspond to the federal
provisions.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Arkansas: Nesterenko v. Arkansas Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 69
S.W.3d 459, 462 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) ("In both the multiple punishment and
multiple prosecution contexts, this Court has concluded that where the two of-
fenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the 'same-
elements' test, the double jeopardy bar applies.") (internal quotation marks al-
tered).
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California: People v. Sipe, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266, 278 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) ("To determine if a defendant is being punished twice for the same of-
fense, we look to both statutory provisions to see if each 'requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."') (citing Blockburger).
Colorado: People v. Abiodun, 111 P.3d 462, 465 (Colo. 2005) ("In this
jurisdiction, an accused may not be convicted of two offenses if one is included
within the other, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-408(1)(a) (2004); and an offense is
so included if it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts re-
quired to establish the commission of the other § 18-1-408(5)(a). We have on
numerous occasions referred to this standard as the "statutory elements test," or
the "Blockburger test," equating it with the test developed in Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), as a means of assessing whether sepa-
rate statutory offenses will be considered the same in applying the constitutional
protection against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense.")
Connecticut: State v. Cotton, 825 A.2d 189, 200 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)
The traditional test for determining whether two offenses are the same offense
for double jeopardy purposes was set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, (1932) ("[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not....").
Delaware: Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599, 605 (Del. 2003) ("This Court
has previously stated that the Blockburger test 'is only an aid to statutory con-
struction. It does not negate clearly expressed legislative intent and where ... a
better indicator of legislative intent is available, it does not apply."') (internal
quotation marks altered).
District of Columbia: Whalen v. U.S., 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980) ("The
legislative history rather clearly confirms that Congress intended the federal
courts to adhere strictly to the Blockburger test when construing the penal pro-
visions of the District of Columbia Code.")
Florida: Gorday v. State, 907 So.2d 640, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
("Legislative intent to authorize dual convictions and sentences may be ex-
pressly stated in a statute or discerned through the Blockburger statutory con-
struction test, which has been codified in Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes
(2002)").
Georgia: Perkinson v. State, 542 S.E.2d 92, 95 (Ga. 2001) ("Unless
each offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecutions as well as cumulative
punishment.") (citing Blockburger, internal quotations omitted).
Idaho: State v. Bryant, 896 P.2d 350, 355 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) ("An
included offense is one which is necessarily committed in the commission of
another offense; or one whose essential elements are charged in the information
as the manner or means by which the more serious offense was committed.").
Illinois: People v. Sienkiewicz, 802 N.E.2d 767, 771 (InI. 2003) ("Thus,
we take this opportunity to reject explicitly the Corbin test and to readopt the
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Blockburger same-elements test as the proper means of examining potential
violations of the Illinois double jeopardy clause.").
Iowa: State v. Schmitz, 610 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 2000) ("In analyz-
ing this type of double jeopardy claim, we look at the legislature's intent and
frequently resort to the Blockburger "same-elements" test under which the ele-
ments of the two offenses are compared to determine whether one is a lesser-
included offense of the other.").
Kansas: State v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48 (Kan. 2006) ("we hold that
the test to determine whether charges in a complaint or information under dif-
ferent statutes are multiplicitous is whether each offense requires proof of an
element not necessary to prove the other offense...").
Kentucky: Com. v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996) ("double
jeopardy issues arising out of multiple prosecutions henceforth will be analyzed
in accordance with the principles set forth in Blockburger v. United States, su-
pra, and KRS 505.020.").
Maine: State v. Pineo, 798 A.2d 1093, 1097 (Me. 2002) ("As we have
held numerous times, the right to be free from double jeopardy under the Maine
Constitution is coextensive with the right under the U.S. Constitution.").
Maryland: Marquardt v. State, 882 A.2d 900, 931 (Md. 2005) ("The
focus is on the elements of each offense; if all of the elements of one offense are
included in the other offense, so that only the latter offense contains a distinct
element or distinct elements, the former merges into the latter.") (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
Massachusetts: Com. v. Rabb, 725 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (Mass. 2000)
("This test, which we have adopted as a rule of Massachusetts common law, was
applied by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger....").
Michigan: People v. Nutt, 677 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Mich. 2004) ("this Court
more than one hundred years ago rejected the 'same transaction' approach and
instead embraced the federal same-elements test as supplying the functional
definition of 'same offense' under our Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause").
Minnesota: State v. McAlpine, 352 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) ("The applicable double jeopardy test is the so-called Blockburger test...
.9").
Mississippi: Houston v. State, 887 So.2d 808, 814 (Miss. Ct. App.
2004) ("In determining whether double jeopardy attaches, we apply the same
elements test.") (citing Blockburger).
Missouri: Yates v. State, 158 S.W.3d 798, 802 (Mo. 2005) ("[W]here
the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provi-
sions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not.") (quoting Blockburger).
Nebraska: State v. Winkler, 663 N.W.2d 102, 106 (Neb. 2003) ("pro-
tection provided by Nebraska's double jeopardy clause is coextensive with that
provided by the U.S. Constitution.").
(Vol. 109
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Nevada: Wilson v. State, 114 P.3d 285, 294 (Nev. 2005) ("Nevada uses
the Blockburger test to determine whether multiple convictions arising from a
single incident are permissible, or to the contrary, if the charges amount to a
lesser-included offense that is barred by double jeopardy.").
New Hampshire: State v. Constant, 605 A.2d 206, 207 (N.H. 1992).
("Two offenses will be considered the same unless each requires proof of an
element that the other does not.").
New Jersey: State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1186 (N.J. 1994)
("If, however, the legislative intent to allow multiple punishment is not clear,
the Court must then apply the test articulated in Blockburger . . . to determine
whether the defendant is unconstitutionally faced with multiple punishment for
the 'same' offense.") (internal quotation marks altered).
New Mexico: State v. Rodriguez, 116 P.3d 92, 96 (N.M. 2005) ("For
purposes of double jeopardy, the phrase 'same offense' has a specific meaning.
'[T]he test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not."') (quoting Blockburger, internal quotation marks altered).
New York: People v. Lanahan, 714 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) ("The test for determining whether two offenses are the same within the
meaning of the double jeopardy clause is whether two distinct statutory provi-
sions each requires proof of a fact that the other does not.") (citations omitted)
North Carolina: State v. Gay, 434 S.E.2d 840, 853 (N.C. 1993) ("De-
fendant argues that although the two theories of accomplice liability under
which she was convicted of first-degree murder do not violate double jeopardy
under the test set forth in [Blockburger], this Court should find that they do vio-
late the more flexible test announced in Grady... We decline to do so since the
test announced in Grady has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court.
U.S. v. Dixon...").
North Dakota: City of Fargo v. Hector, 534 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D.
1995) ('The framers of our state constitution and the legislature in enacting the
statute did not intend an interpretation different than the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution ..... We apply the clause and statute
in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court applies the federal con-
stitution.") (citation omitted).
Ohio: State v. Sellers, No. 85611, 2005 WL 3030913, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 10, 2005) ("The applicable rule under the Fifth Amendment is that
where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or
only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not. A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute re-
quires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or con-
viction under either statute does not exempt a defendant from prosecution and
punishment under the other.") (citation omitted).
Oklahoma: McElmurry v. State, 60 P.3d 4, 24 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002)
("Oklahoma followed Dixon in Mooney v. State, 1999 OK CR 34, 17, 990
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P.2d 875, 883-84, and we now exclusively apply the Blockburger test for double
jeopardy. Under the Blockburger test, two crimes are not the same crime for
double jeopardy purposes if both crimes require proof of an element not re-
quired by the other.") (emphasis in original).
Rhode Island: State v. Bolarinho, 850 A.2d 907, 909 (R.I. 2004) ("The
test that this Court has adopted for determining whether an accused stands in
danger of being twice tried or punished for the same offense is often referred to
as the same evidence test... and comes to us from Blockburger. .. .") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
South Carolina: State v. Cuccia, 578 S.E.2d 45, 49 (S.C. Ct. App.
2003) ('The United States Supreme Court and the South Carolina Supreme
Court have determined that in the context of criminal penalties, the Blockburger
'same elements' test is the sole test of double jeopardy in successive prosecu-
tions and multiple punishment cases.") (citation omitted and quotation marks
altered).
South Dakota: State v. Weaver, 648 N.W.2d 355, 361 (S.D. 2002)
("Blockburger instructs that where the same act or transaction constitutes a vio-
lation of two distinct statutes, the Court must determine whether each statute
requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not.").
Texas: Cobb v. State 85 S.W.3d 258, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
("Texas has long used the same Blockburger test to analyze Fifth Amendment
double jeopardy issues that the Supreme Court used to decide this case").
Utah: State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 90-91 (Utah 1993) ("the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each
provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not") (quot-
ing Blockburger) (overruled on other grounds).
Vermont: State v. Parker, 189 A.2d 540, 542 (Vt. 1963) ("the same act
may constitute two separate crimes, and, if they are not so related that one of
them is a constituent part, or necessary element, in the other, so that both are in
fact one transaction, a prosecution and conviction may be had for each of-
fense.").
Virginia: Com. v. Hudgins, 611 S.E.2d 362, C15 (Va. 2005) ("In apply-
ing the Blockburger test, the court considers the offenses charged in the abstract,
without reference to the particular facts of the case under review.") (citations
omitted).
Washington: State v. R.A., No. 54102-1-1, 2005 WL 2271889, at *5
(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2005) ("Washington courts apply a rule of statutory
construction that has been variously termed the 'same elements' test, the 'same
evidence' test, and the Blockburger test.' Under this test, there is a double jeop-
ardy violation if the defendant is convicted of offenses that are identical both in
fact and law. But '[i]f there is an element in each offense which is not included
in the other, and proof of one offense would not necessarily also prove the other,
the offenses are not constitutionally the same and the double jeopardy clause
does not prevent convictions for both offenses."') (internal quotation marks al-
tered and citations omitted).
[Vol. 109
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West Virginia: State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Sanders, 565 S.E.2d 419,
427-28 (W. Va. 2002) ("[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a viola-
tion of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not.") (quoting Blockburger) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Wyoming: Longstreth v. State, 890 P.2d 551, 553 (Wyo. 1995) ("this
court adopted the 'Blockburger test' or 'statutory elements test' as the founda-
tion for double jeopardy protection in connection with both multiple prosecu-
tions and multiple or cumulative punishments.") (internal quotation marks al-
tered and omitted).
STATES THAT GO BEYOND BLOCKBURGER
Whether the following courts carefully distinguish between sameness of
evidence as opposed to sameness of elements is not always clear.
Hawaii: State v. Feliciano, 107 Haw. 469, 477 (Haw. 2005) ("the Ha-
wai'i Constitution provides greater protection against 'successive prosecutions'
than does the United States Constitution, and adopted the 'same conduct' test in
'successive prosecution' cases.") (internal quotation marks altered).
Indiana: Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999) ("two or
more offenses are the 'same offense' in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the
Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the chal-
lenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of
one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another chal-
lenged offense.").
Louisiana: State v. Cotton, 778 So. 2d 569, 573 (La. 2001) ("In evalu-
ating claims of double jeopardy ... Louisiana courts have used the same evi-
dence test, which we have remarked is somewhat broader in concept than
Blockburger... [and is] stated as follows: If the evidence required to support a
finding of guilt of one crime would also have supported conviction of the other,
the two are the same offense under a plea of double jeopardy, and a defendant
can be placed in jeopardy for only one. The test depends on the evidence neces-
sary for conviction, not all the evidence introduced at trial.") (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Montana: State v. Gazda, 82 P.3d 20, 22 (Mont. 2003) (pursuant to
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504, a subsequent prosecution is barred when "(1) a
defendant's conduct constitutes an offense within the jurisdiction of the court
where the first prosecution occurred and within the jurisdiction of the court
where the subsequent prosecution is pursued; (2) the first prosecution results in
an acquittal or a conviction; and (3) the subsequent prosecution is based on an
offense arising out of the same transaction.") (citation omitted).
Oregon: State v. Brown, 497 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Or. 1972) ("We are
convinced that the 'same evidence' test does not provide adequate protection,
under modern conditions, from the evils contemplated by the double jeopardy
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guarantee. We hold that under Article I, Section 12, of our Constitution, statu-
tory violations may be the 'same offense' for purposes of testing a second
prosecution, even though each contains different elements and requires proof of
different facts."). See also OR. REV. STAT. § 131.515 (2006).
Wisconsin: State v. Multaler, 632 N.W.2d 89, 102 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)
("We have established a two-part test for analyzing multiplicity challenges. The
first part consists of an analysis under Blockburger [. . .] to determine whether
the offenses are identical in law and fact.... The second part, which we reach if
the offenses are not identical in law and fact, is an inquiry into legislative in-
tent.") (citation omitted).
STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED DIFFERENT TESTS
Alaska: Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 312 (Alaska 1970) ("[To de-
termine if two offense are the same for double jeopardy purposes] [t]he trial
judge first would compare the different statutes in question, as they apply to the
facts of the case, to determine whether there were involved differences in intent
or conduct. He would then judge any such differences he found in light of the
basic interests of society to be vindicated or protected, and decide whether those
differences were substantial or significant enough to warrant multiple punish-
ments.").
Tennessee: State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 381 (Tenn. 1996) ("reso-
lution of a double jeopardy punishment issue under the Tennessee Constitution
requires the following: (1) a Blockburger analysis of the statutory offenses; (2)
an analysis. . . of the evidence used to prove the offenses; (3) a consideration of
whether there were multiple victims or discrete acts; and (4) a comparison of the
purposes of the respective statutes. None of these steps is determinative; rather
the results of each must be weighed and considered in relation to each other.").
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